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The purpose of this paper is to discuss why I think the Reagan administration's
avowed commitment1 to helping only "actual victims" of racial discrimination
retards rather than advances the cause of civil rights. I make reference in my title to
"seniority" and "the shadow ofStotts" because the current administration is relying
upon Supreme Court decisions having to do with seniority, particularly its 1984
opinion in Memphis Firefighters v. Stotts,2 to justify a wholesale attack upon race-
conscious remedies, not only in employment but in education and public contracting
as well.
But how can an effort to help actual victims ofdiscrimination be anything but a
positive development? Why should I be criticizing rather than praising what the
Reaganites are doing? The short answer is that this policy of helping only "actual
victims" of discrimination has another objective: namely, to bring to an end a variety
of class-based remedies such as goals and timetables, numerical measures, quotas,
etc., that courts and administrative agencies have found necessary, in some cases, to
rectify the effects of past discrimination and to ensure the absence of discrimination
in the future.
The Reagan administration's approach to helping only "actual victims" of
discrimination threatens to undermine years ofmeaningful civil rights enforcement
and to hobble future efforts to remedy the lingering effects ofdiscrimination. This
position, despite the administration's drumbeat of public statements to the contrary,
is not endorsed by the United States Supreme Court or by any of the 12 circuit courts
of appeals, the level just below the Supreme Court. It is a position that does not, even
ifvigorously pursued, offer much hope for realistic change in national patterns of
racial discrimination. And, finally, it is not a position that the Reagan
administration, in my estimation, intends to pursue with vigor. Other evidence
suggests that the administration, for all of its avowed commitment to civil rights, is
engaged in a cynical campaign of sloganeering designed to give the appearance of
movement where, in fact, there is none.
The Reagan administration's position on this issue is essentially as follows. The
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to establish colorblindness as the
constitutional standard. Plessy v. Ferguson
,
3 the 1896 Supreme Court decision that
established the "separate but equal" doctrine, violated the colorblind principle (some
call it the antidiscrimination principle) by using racial classifications with respect to
public accommodations and by providing the basis for Jim Crow laws affecting
education, voting, and every other area of public life for the next 58 years. Brown v.
Board of Education ,4 the 1954 ruling declaring the separate but equal doctrine
unconstitutional in the field of public education, rectified the error ofPlessy and
returned us to the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. Race could
no longer be an appropriate consideration in the allocation of public benefits or
burdens. Since Brown, however, the Reagan administration says that society,
propelled by federal courts and administrative agencies, has swung back in the
direction of race-consciousness, committing the same error as at the time ofPlessy,
albeit in this case in favor of, not against, blacks and other racial minorities.
They tend to cite as examples of this trend: busing to achieve desegregation of
previously dual school systems because it requires the assignment of children by
race; goals and timetables or quotas to remedy proven racial discrimination in
employment and housing; and voluntary race-conscious plans to remedy significant
underrepresentation of minorities in employment, public contracting, and higher
education admissions. Such practices, according to the Reagan administration, not
only violate the Constitution but do violence to the purposes of the modern civil rights
statutes (like the 1964 Civil Rights Act) as well.
Their solution is as follows to the best ofmy understanding: (1) Laws should be
enforced in a colorblind fashion. (2) Those who discriminate should be enjoined from
doing so in the future. (3) Persons who were the specific targets of such
discrimination are entitled to individualized relief ("actual victims"). (4) No other
persons are entitled to anything.
But let us look at what the courts have said about the colorblind Constitution.
The Supreme Court has never held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause prohibits the use of race classifications under all circumstances.
Rather, it has required (putting Plessy and the separate but equal doctrine line of
cases to one side) that racial classifications be justified by the showing of a compelling
governmental purpose. Race classifications are disfavored and inherently suspect
under this analysis. Post-5 rown, innumerable classification schemes that
disadvantaged blacks or other racial minorities were struck down on this basis. The
only Supreme Court case that employed this rigorous test and yet upheld a scheme
that penalized a racial minority, before or after Brown, was the Korematsu decision.
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This decision found constitutional the relocation ofJapanese-Americans during the
Second World War.
In more recent years, the Court has upheld racial classifications as
constitutionally based upon its conclusion that such approaches were necessary to
effectively remedy discrimination against blacks and other racial minorities. In the
area of school desegregation, for example, the Supreme Court concluded that the
mandate ofBrown could not be satisfied by a school board's merely announcing that
pupil assignments would no longer be made on a racially segregated basis, leaving
deeply-rooted patterns of the dual systems in place. Rather, school boards, said the
Court, had an affirmative duty to see that the old patterns were ended "root and
branch."6 If busing was necessary to achieve this end, so be it. System-wide racial
ratios were later approved as a starting point in determining the level of
desegregation required on a school-by-school basis in such systems.7
The Bakke decision,8 although it struck down the Davis Medical School special
admissions program, did not reject the use of race in admissions. Many schools after
Bakke have continued to take race into consideration in making admissions decisions.
These programs have withstood lower federal and state court scrutiny.9 In the 1980
Fullilove decision the Supreme Court upheld a federal 10% set-aside for minority
business enterprises as part of a $4 billion public works program. 10
Lower federal courts and state courts have adhered to these precedents, often
recognizing, even if the Supreme Court did not publicize it, that in Bakke and
Fullilove (affirmative action decisions) some justices were no longer using the
"compelling interest test" but were using something less rigorous to evaluate the
racial classifications at issue. In neither the Supreme Court nor other federal or state
courts has the proposition that only "actual victims" of discrimination are entitled to
benefit from remedial orders been adopted.
Judicial interpretations of the civil rights statutes have also recognized an
appropriate place for racial considerations. In the 1979 Weber decision,! 1 the
Supreme Court upheld the use of race in a crafts-training program agreed to by labor
and management. It said that the plan did not violate Title VTI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, which prohibits employment discrimination. The Reagan administration
contends that Weber was wrongly decided. The Court has also held that busing to
achieve desegregation of previously dual systems did not violate another provision of
the 1964 Act. 12 It even upheld the use of race to remedy evidence of discrimination in
voting as not prohibited by the 1965 Voting Rights Act. 13 In none of these cases has
the scope of relief turned on whether one was an "actual victim" of discrimination.
What has been left undecided? The Supreme Court has yet to rule explicitly on
several major questions pertinent to this discussion, all of which are raised by cases
before it for decision this term. 1 4 Can courts order race-conscious programs in
employment, designed to remedy proven discrimination, that benefit persons other
than those specifically found to have been denied a job, promotion, or assignment
based upon race? In other words, are goals, timetables, and quotas appropriate? 15
Can courts approve of settlements or proposed consent decrees that contain provisions
designed to avoid the litigation of employment discrimination claims? 16 Can
governmental entities establish, consistent with the requirements of the
Constitution, voluntary race-conscious affirmative action programs like that
approved (insofar as private employment was concerned) in the Weber decision? 1 ?
The Reagan administration contends that all these questions were effectively
answered by the Supreme Court's recent decision (6-3) in the Memphis Firefighters
case called Stotts. A careful reading of the decision, however, does not support such
an interpretation. In brief, Stotts ruled that lower federal courts could not require
that seniority rules be overridden in order to prevent disproportionate layoffs of
recently hired black firefighters. I will have more to say about the Court's
characterization of the issue presented for decision in a later section. Given that
characterization, the Court's decision was quite predictable. First, it had previously
held, on several occasions, that Title VH of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits
racial discrimination on both public and private employment, insulates seniority
systems from court restructuring, even if they perpetuate other forms of employment
discrimination, unless it can be shown that the system at issue itself was created,
maintained, or manipulated with a discriminatory purpose or intent. 18 Second, it
also had held previously that where discrimination was evident in hiring, promotion,
assignment, or other terms and conditions of employment, the appropriate remedy
was to give actual victims of such practices, all other things being equal, the seniority
they would have had but for the discrimination. 19 This is commonly called the
"rightful place" doctrine.
The Stotts record was devoid of evidence of either type of discrimination.
Properly read, the holding in Stotts is merely a reiteration of rulings the Court has
made on several occasions in the past. It reinforces the view that seniority systems
enjoy powerful protection from attack under Title VII. Overriding seniority to allow
for race-conscious layoffs, Stotts says, violates the very essence of that protection. It
is in this context of seniority-and only here-that the Court has found a statutory
requirement that only "actual victims" be given individualized relief.
It is true, however, that the opinion speaks generally (outside the seniority
context) about the Title VTTs purpose being to provide only "actual victims" of
discrimination with relief. But the discussion is subject to a variety of
interpretations, of which the administration's is only one. It is equally true,
moreover, that the same opinion notes-and appears to find no statutory problem
with-the consent decree that underlies the entire controversy in Stotts. Blacks had,
several years earlier, filed suit against the Memphis Fire Department alleging racial
discrimination in hiring and promotion. That suit was settled prior to trial, and the
settlement was embodied in a consent decree in the 1980 trial.
Under that decree, the Memphis fire department agreed to establish a 50%
black interim hiring goal and a 20% black promotion goal until the proportion of
black representation in each job classification in the fire department was
approximately that of blacks in the labor force in the county within which Memphis
is located. Parenthetically, the fire department had entered into a similar
arrangement with the U.S. Department of Justice in 1974 in settlement of a. federal
employment discrimination suit. The Stotts opinion described the 1980 decree in the
following terms:
[I]t is reasonable to believe that the "remedy," which was the
purpose of the decree to provide, would not exceed the bounds of
the remedies that are appropriate under Title VTI.
What the Court found wrong in Stotts was not the underlying consent decree
containing goals and timetables. Rather it was the attempt by the trial court and
court of appeals to engraft upon that decree a provision that had not been agreed to by
the parties that violated Titled VII. That provision, added by the courts, required
that in the event of layoffs affirmative action considerations might be permitted to
override the application of "last hired, first fired" seniority principles. It is difficult to
see, therefore, how Stotts can be viewed as prohibiting all use of goals and timetables
to assist "nonvictims," as the Reagan administration contends, not only where
seniority issues are involved but also in hiring and promotion situations where
seniority is not a controlling factor.
The Stotts decision explicitly declines to address the question of whether Weber
can legally be applied to the case of public employers. Yet, one Reagan
administration official stated with some confidence, after Stotts, that it would not be
long before the Court concluded that voluntary affirmative action programs were
unconstitutional.2 *) Nor does Stotts address the question of whether courts can,
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, provide relief to other than "actual
victims" in remedying racial discrimination.
I cannot avoid noting here my objection to the way the Supreme Court and
indeed the Justice Department characterized the issue in Stotts. One is left with the
distinct impression that what happened there was that federal courts exercised raw
power to favor less senior blacks over more senior whites in the layoff process in the
name of affirmative action. Two things are wrong with that characterization. First,
Memphis, not the courts, decided that a race-conscious layoff plan was necessary.
The Firefighters Union itself had offered a number of racially neutral approaches
that would have achieved significant economies (reducing working hours of all
employees, for example).
Second, the three white firefighters who were laid off for only a month were
characterized as the victims of the layoff plan. Yet they had exactly the same
seniority dates as three blacks who were not laid off. The "seniority system," which
the lower courts ignored, was, in fact, an alphabetical layoff scheme. In the event
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that workers had the same seniority and equal work records, layoffs would occur in
reverse alphabetical order. Hence, under the city's original plan, Johnson, Jones, and
McFagon, (blacks) were to be laid off and Darden, Dennington, and Harmon, (whites)
were to be retained. What happened, therefore, was that blacks-who were equally
qualified and of equal seniority to whites-hired pursuant to the consent decree would
be laid off and their white counterparts kept on because of the fortuitous first letter of
their surnames.
Based upon Stotts, the Reagan Justice Department last year sent letters to over
50 communities advising them that their affirmative action programs were illegal
and threatening to sue them to have such programs discontinued if they did not do so
voluntarily.21 It should be noted that in all these cases the affirmative action
programs being attacked were initiated with the approval of the Nixon, Ford, and
Carter Justice Departments. Most communities have refused to change their
programs. The mayor of Indianapolis, a Republican, has been most vocal in his
opposition to what the department is doing.22 And lower federal courts have
continued to order goals and timetables as remedies for employment discrimination
post- Stotts,23 except where doing so would override seniority provisions,24 viewing
those situations as explicitly controlled by that decision.
But why should remedies for discrimination that benefit other than so-called
"actual victims" of discrimination be allowed as a matter of public policy, apart from
what the current or future legal standards may require? Wouldn't we all be better off
if we kept the use of racial criteria to an absolute minimum? Why have the courts
taken this approach in the past? Why have federal judges of all political persuasions
and state judges, both elected and appointed, all over the country acted as they have?
Let me offer a few answers.
I have already spoken about school desegregation and the imposition of an
affirmative duty upon school boards to do more than declare the end to segregated
assignment patterns. I take it that this administration's view of school desegregation
is that only black children affirmatively assigned to schools by race or denied
admission to a public school based upon their race are "actual victims" of
discrimination. For their benefit, courts may order specific remedies. But the
Supreme Court, at least since 1968, and other courts thereafter have seen things
differently. They have viewed the constitutional violation as one against blacks as a
class, for which a class remedy is appropriate.
A recent decision by a federal district court in Nashville, Tennessee, approving
a consent decree designed to resolve a 17-year-old higher education desegregation
case points up this conflict between traditional approaches and the Reagan
administration's policies. Without going into excruciating detail about this case (a
temptation I find hard to resist since I was co-counsel for plaintiffs during a month-
long trial of this case in 1976), suffice it to say that federal courts found in 1972 that
the State ofTennessee had been operating a dual higher education system 18 years
after Brown. Courts also found in 1977 that the state had engaged in specific
segregative acts in the Nashville area to provide white college students with a way of
avoiding attendance at Tennessee State University (the traditionally black public
institution in that community). Specific relief was ordered for Nashville but not for
the state as a whole.
The most recent skirmishes have focused on state-wide relief. After much
discussion the state and private plaintiffs reached a settlement, which was approved
by the district court over the partial objection of the Justice Department. Among
other things, the Reagan administration opposes a provision of the settlement that
requires the state, over a period of five years, to establish a special "pre-enrollment"
program for 75 black sophomore students to train and prepare them for post-graduate
study in the state's professional schools. Upon completion of the program, these
students will be admitted to the state's schools of law, veterinary medicine, dentistry,
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pharmacy, and medicine. The administration's opposition to this program stems
from the fact that the 75 students are not "actual victims" of discrimination.
The trial court's opinion contains the following response to that argument:
It is the past and present state ofTennessee's universities that
the Court identifies as the specific instance of racial
discrimination; its effects are pervasive throughout the black
community, affecting practically all black men, women and
children in the state.25
The Washington Post reported a blunter response from the judge. It quoted him as
having said to the department's lawyer in the case:
You are an embarrassment to the United States Justice
Department or maybe it's that someone is telling you what to
say....Let's just shell the corn. ..your real problem is that
President Ronald Reagan and Attorney General William
French Smith are philosophically opposed to anything that
smacks of goals or objectives or quotas. Isn't that right?26
That this criticism came from a judge who, I can personally attest, is no bleeding
heart or knee-jerk liberal but rather conservative, in fact, may suggest to you how far
this administration's policies have departed from conventional doctrine. The Justice
Department has appealed the approval of the pre-enrollment program and other
provisions that it regards as unconstitutional.
Moreover, goals and timetables or other injunctive relief affording benefits to
nonvictims have been granted by courts to ensure that a defendant found guilty of
discrimination does not continue such practices in the future, particularly if that
discrimination was longstanding, pervasive, and intentional. 2? Courts have not
rushed to impose such requirements but have done so often only after lesser measures
effected no changes. Courts have tended to avoid imposing goals and timetables or
quotas in race discrimination where to do so would displace an identifiable group of
incumbent white employees. Hence hiring rather than promotion is the stage of the
employment process where such techniques are utilized most often. 28
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Furthermore, consent decrees and settlements have been approved that contain
goals and timetables because such voluntary solutions are consistent with the
underlying purposes of Title VH, namely, to stimulate corrective measures short of
protracted litigation. Voluntary programs fit into the same basic pattern. Finally, a
variety of statutory provisions make actual victimization dependent upon procedural
niceties, not whether discrimination actually occurred. Under Title VH, for example,
victims of discrimination prior to 1964 have little or no recourse. Even so-called
"actual victims" post-1964 can lose out by not filing their administrative complaints
within 180 days of the violation.29
But suppose the "actual victim" approach was used in nonseniority situations?
Ifno victims or only a few of the "actual victims" can be found, then the person guilty
of racial discrimination gets a windfall. An employer can be found liable for
discrimination against blacks as a class but may be allowed to continue with an all-
white, or virtually all-white, work force until another victim comes to light. That
operation stands as a potent symbol that one can discriminate and get away with it.
It is a continuing sign to blacks that they will not be welcome in that operation and
need not apply. Such an approach creates all the wrong incentives and disincentives
in terms of the objectives of Title VII. Similar examples could be given in the
housing, public contracting, education, and voting areas. What, for example, is the
proper remedy for a black that graduated from Tennessee State University 15 years
ago? He or she is unlikely-even though an actual victim because of discrimination in
admissions-to graduate or to do professional study in Tennessee, to want to take
advantage of the pre-enrollment program embodied in the recent consent decree. But
that is what the Reagan administration seems to require.
Ifwe found "actual victims" of discrimination, we might also be obliged to seek
out whites who were the windfall beneficiaries of discrimination and see to it that,
where necessary, remedies for "actual victims" be granted at the expense of
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incumbent whites. But the courts have not and will not be willing, it seems to me, to
take this approach in even seniority cases where it can be shown that whites occupied
positions and situations that would not have been their's but for discrimination
against blacks. Hence "rightful place" seniority relief has not been interpreted by
lower courts, as the Court pointed out in Stotts, to require "bumping" ofincumbent
whites. The Court's reaction has been understandable, for often white workers have
not knowingly discriminated against blacks. The culprit in the piece is the employer.
More exacting demands ought to be made upon the employers, not workers, to remedy
the discriminatory effects.
But I think that there is evidence that the Reagan administration has no
intention of pursuing with vigor this "actual victim" approach. Under the best view
of their motivations they simply misunderstand the problems presented by any
serious attempt to implement their vision. For example, an official at the Federal
Equal Employment Opportunities Commission was questioned about its new
emphasis upon requiring "unconditional offers" to place victims of bias in the job they
would have had if no discrimination had occurred, even if the job has been filled by
another person. "Won't such an approach create another set of victims in the work
place-those who were given jobs through discriminatory actions over which they had
no control?" he was asked. "Not really," he responded, "we're talking about a job that
should have gone to that victim, not a job based on goals and timetables."30
How this approach can be viewed as less problematic and less socially divisive
than properly utilized goals and timetables in the spirit of Title VTI is hard for me to
comprehend. Moreover, this type of individualized enforcement has not been pursued
even by the Justice Department, to m> knowledge, and only half-heartedly by the
EEOC or the Department of Labor for the simple reason that their resources could not
begin to support such an undertaking. I see nothing to suggest that massive
resources to do the job will be forthcoming under this administration.
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Viewed less charitably, however, this emphasis upon "actual victims" is
nothing but a publicity stunt. The administration has taken or promised certain
actions that belie their avowed commitment to this course. Let me mention only four.
First, it has already attempted, unsuccessfully, to increase significantly the burden
black plaintiffs must carry in order to establish a case of employment discrimination.
Under the prevailing doctrine a plaintiff in a so-called disparate treatment case has
to show only that he or she is black, was qualified for the job, applied for a job or
promotion, was denied the job, and the job remained open thereafter. Yet, the
Reagan Justice Department attempts to get the Supreme Court to hold that a case
could be established only if the black plaintiff could show that he or she was as or
more qualified than the person actually hired. 31 The logic is simple. If plaintiffs
have this heavier burden to carry, they have less chance of prevailing, less chance of
qualifying as an "actual victim," and less chance of being entitled to full recovery.
Second, a top Justice Department official has recently suggested that all
current requirements that employers maintain personnel records on race, sex, or
national origin should be abolished. With no such statistics, there can be no serious
search for "actual victims" and no serious assessment of compliance with
antidiscrimination laws.32
Third, the administration has attempted, ever since the beginning of the first
Reagan term, to cut back drastically on regulations promulgated pursuant to
Executive Order 11246, the contract compliance order requiring government
contractors to take affirmative steps to avoid discrimination against racial
minorities. The matter is currently the subject of intense debate between Labor
Secretary Brock and Attorney General Meese, with the latter seeking a total end to
the use of goals or timetables. 33 Of course, I find it heartening that Secretary Brock
is for more modest revisions of the order. But, however that debate is resolved, it is
likely that this administration, ultimately, will water down a potent tool utilized by
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every president from Franklin Roosevelt to Jimmy Carter to open up jobs for
minorities and women.
Fourth, we have seen this play before. Early in Reagan's first term, the head of
Reagan's Civil Rights Division in the Justice Department announced that he was
going to dispense with traditional desegregation litigation techniques. Instead, he
was going to go school by school to ensure that blacks were not denied equal
educational resources.34 I have yet to see that policy implemented in a single
community. It was not meant to be.
So, helping only "actual victims" may turn out to be a severe blow to civil rights
by bringing class-based relief to a halt and replacing it with what, under the best of
circumstances, will be a puny, ineffective attack upon pervasive examples of
lingering racial discrimination. What sounds like a noble effort consistent with the
best traditions ofAmerica-helping "actual victims" of discrimination-is at best a
naive and senseless undertaking and at worst a cynical political game.
I have a feeling that the courts will continue to see this program for what it
really is. My fear, however, is that public energy and the prior commitment to
addressing our legacy of racism will be diverted and disheartened by these untiring
efforts of the Reagan administration to turn the clock back.
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